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Abstract: Compared to all other countries in the world, Germany has been a “low-
fertility country” for a longer period: the total fertility rate has been below 1.5 for 
four decades. Being the fi rst to experience this development, a case study of Ger-
many allows analysing the consequences of an enduring birth decline. In Germany, 
low fertility is also an increasingly big issue in politics as well as science, especially 
due to its extensive consequences on several policy fi elds that already become vis-
ible. However, the assessment of the consequences differs tremendously when it 
comes either to its intensity or to the question whether ageing or rather population 
decline is the more severe problem. Differentiated by these two processes, this 
article combines demographic analysis with the assessment of the consequences 
for different policy fi elds such as pensions, health, the economy, the labour market, 
culture, the EU, international relations and the party system. 
For all these policy fi elds, the consequences are serious, and partly ambivalent 
but overall negative. The occurrence of the consequences and the different policy 
options how to deal with these consequences differ considerably between the policy 
fi elds. Ageing is a more severe problem than shrinking, because the severe changes 
in the age structure in the social security system that will take place until 2040 ap-
ply to most Germans and are inevitable. On the other hand, the population decline 
can still be avoided demographically and does not affect all inhabitants negatively. 
Regarding the consequences of a declining population, one has to differentiate be-
tween an individual and a national perspective. National consequences are rather 
negative due to a decline of international infl uence and power, especially within the 
European Union. The study also demonstrates that the long-term consequences 
of enduring low fertility are not necessarily negative for political competition, the 
culture, the labour market and the economy, if appropriate political action is taken. 
The analysis also identifi es possible future demographic and political parameters. 
Thus, this case study is relevant for other low-fertility countries, which will have to 
face similar demographic processes in the future.
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1 Introduction
In 2012, there have already been 29 “low-fertility countries” worldwide (World Bank 
2014), being defi ned as having a total fertility rate (TFR) of less than 1.5. Most of 
these 29 countries have however only been affected by this phenomenon for one 
or two decades. Compared to all other countries in the world, the Federal Republic 
of Germany has been a low-fertility country for a longer period, in fact, for four 
decades.1 Despite Germany, other countries also exhibited a continuously low TFR 
such as Italy since 1984, Spain since 1988, and Japan, Bulgaria and Romania since 
1993. The case of Germany is especially interesting for the analysis of the long-term 
impact of an enduring low fertility since a second generation is already affected by 
this phenomenon. This leads to the situation that consequences are already clearly 
visible and a large number of analyses are available from different disciplines. The 
following case study analyses the impact of the enduring low fertility in Germany. 
Despite several specifi cally German contexts, the fi ndings are relevant for many 
other countries as they are facing similar challenges, albeit delayed.
The enduring low fertility and the demographic change are receiving a massive 
amount of attention in politics, the media and the scientifi c community in Germany. 
(cf. Barlösius/Schiek 2007; Stock et al. 2012). There is even talk now of “demography 
policy” as constituting a separate policy area (Hüther/Naegele 2013; Mayer 2012). 
This big issue has also arrived in politics: the German Federal Government com-
missioned a Demography Report (BMI [Federal Ministry of the Interior] 2012) and 
developed a Demography Strategy (BMI 2013). Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel is 
placing demographic change on the same level as globalisation (Merkel 2012). The 
fact that many policy areas are directly affected by demographic change is shown 
not lastly by the cooperation of almost all the Federal Ministries in establishing the 
Federal Government’s Demography Strategy as well as the presence of eight Fed-
eral Ministers and of the Federal Chancellor at the fi rst two “Demography Summits”, 
which were held in 2012 and 2013.
“Demographic change, along with globalisation, probably constitutes the 
greatest change in our society, but also in the personal life of each individ-
ual, in the fi rst half of the 21st Century.” (Merkel 2012; translated by CPoS)
In view of this signifi cance, it is astonishing how very different the assessments 
of the impact of the low fertility in Germany are. Whilst Birg (2003: 14) sees the 
“demographic demise of Germany” which could be a “herald of our country depart-
ing from its thousand-year history”, Hondrich (2007: 1) considers the low fertility “a 
blessing for our society” (quotations translated by CPoS). These two quotes provide 
examples of the enormous range of assessments. The polarisation between “apoc-
alyptic scenarios” and “downplaying” is characteristic of the debate on low fertility 
in politics, the media and the scientifi c community in Germany. 
1 The TFR was 1.45 in 1975, and has remained below 1.5 since then, ranging at values between 
1.24 and 1.45 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013a).
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How did this come about? There is a multitude of impacts for society, industry 
and politics which need to be considered in order to reach an overall evaluation. The 
individual aspects have been analysed extensively, but no consistent distinction is 
made in most cases between the two demographic consequences of low fertility 
– ageing2 and shrinking of the population. This is, however, necessary in analyti-
cal terms. The assessments found in current literature also diverge fundamentally 
when it comes to the question of whether it is the impact of ageing or of the shrink-
ing process that will be more severe.
Moreover, demographic projections need to be taken into account and their as-
sumptions also need to be appropriately assessed. Analyses are frequently frag-
mented, with demographic analyses of the impacts on one side and, on the other, 
analyses from a social or political science perspective. These circumstances make 
it more diffi cult to systematically assess the different impacts of low fertility plot-
ted against demographic factors, and also to come to a scientifi c overall evaluation. 
This might also be the case why demographic misinterpretations, questionable as-
sumptions or particular views often dominate the assessment of the phenomenon 
of low fertility.
This article analyses the impact of enduring low fertility in Germany for various 
policy areas such as pensions, health, the economy, the labour market, interna-
tional relations and the EU, as well as the society and party competition. To this 
end, a systematic link is created between demographic processes on the one hand 
(Section 3-4) and the political, societal and economic consequences on the other 
(Section 5-6). Based on this link, a synthesis of the consequences of low fertility is 
developed which offers answers to three questions: Which impact does the Ger-
man low fertility have on different policy areas – and when does it happen exactly? 
What kind of political and demographic adjustments will be possible in future? As 
well as: Are greater problems caused by ageing or by shrinking? Finally, the validity 
of the fi ndings for other countries will be discussed.
2 The state of research and analysis strategy
2.1 Current state of research
The second fertility decline, which started in Europe in the mid-1960s, forms part of 
the second demographic transition (van de Kaa 1987). It is distinguished in demog-
raphy as a separate phenomenon compared to the fi rst demographic transition, 
which was accompanied by a considerable decline in child mortality and lasted 
in Germany from 1870 to 1930. As a result of the second fertility decline, the total 
fertility rate (TFR) has settled at 1.2 to 1.5 in Germany and some Southern Euro-
pean and East Asian countries, whilst other industrialised countries in Northern Eu-
2 The term “ageing” is used here for the shift in the age structure according to which the share of 
elderly people in the population increases considerably.
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rope, North America or France have a TFR that is close to the replacement rate of 
2.1 (OECD 2014). In many countries, the TFR is infl uenced by the increasing age of 
women at fi rst birth, and the TFR is lower than the fi nal number of children of the re-
spective cohorts (Bongaarts 2001). In Germany, the TFR has been ranging between 
1.24 and 1.45 since 1975, and hence has been one-third below the replacement level 
for more than a generation (on the causes cf. Bujard et al. 2012). This is the longest 
phase of such a low fertility level ever recorded in the world. 
When analysing the consequences of this enduring low fertility, one needs to 
distinguish between ageing and shrinking in analytical terms (e.g. Swiaczny 2014). 
Both imply a highly diverging impact. The assessment of the consequences of the 
enduring low fertility in Germany varies in the literature with regard to whether it is 
ageing (Sinn 2013) or the population decline (Birg 2003; Kaufmann 2005) which is 
the “worse” development. When it comes to population projections, the infl uence 
of the three major indicators – life expectancy, the migration balance and the birth 
rate –vary fundamentally with regard to ageing and shrinking.
Population projections which include projections both for the size of the pop-
ulation and for ageing are available for example from the United Nations for the 
period up to 2100 (UN 2012), as well as from the Federal Statistical Offi ce (Statis-
tisches Bundesamt 2009a/b) for Germany up to 2060. Trends observed so far from 
demographic indicators are extrapolated, and different models are calculated for 
different assumptions as well as for different combinations of assumptions. These 
projections are explicitly not understood as predictions, but the medium variants 
are nonetheless frequently interpreted as such. It is nonetheless necessary to point 
to two criticisms of these projections: Firstly, the infl uence of the presumed aver-
age age at childbirth on the fertility level is not taken into account in some cases 
(Goldstein et al. 2011), and this may lead to the subsequent underestimation of the 
TFR in the medium variant of the forecast of the Federal Statistical Offi ce (Statis-
tisches Bundesamt 2009a) given that the age at childbirth ceases to rise from 2020 
onwards. Secondly, probabilistic approaches criticise the deterministic nature of 
classical projections and the fact that uncertainty is reproduced by different vari-
ants, and that it is not quantifi ed using confi dence intervals (values for Germany 
see: Scherbov et al. 2008: 40-41). However, probabilistic approaches cannot predict 
the probability of regime collapse or future developments in the assumptions. The 
demographic analyses in Sections 3 and 4 are based on the population projections 
of the Federal Statistical Offi ce since they are dominant in Germany.
The literature on the consequences of the population decline as well as popula-
tion ageing with regard to social systems, the industry, the society, the EU, interna-
tional relations and competition between political parties is extensive. Since current 
research frequently focuses on individual consequences, we will not give an over-
view of the literature review, but rather refer to the state of research at respective 
places in Sections 5 and 6.
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2.2 Analysis strategy
In order to analyse the consequences of the enduring low fertility for a specifi c 
policy area, it is necessary to link demographic and political science perspectives. 
Since the low fertility manifests itself in two different demographic phenomena, 
namely ageing and shrinking, these two processes are each discussed using dif-
ferent projections. Here, the respective dynamics and time frames, as well as their 
likelihood of being infl uenced, are outlined by the three demographic indicators of 
births, migration and life expectancy (see Fig. 1). Analysing the demographic pro-
cesses is necessary in order to understand what infl uence is exerted by the endur-
ing low fertility for instance on the social security systems at what time and with 
what probability. Moreover, it is not suffi cient to only look at a specifi c projection 
value for a single year, but it is rather essential to understand the processes and 
possible adjustments to it. 
Next, the impact of the low fertility on individual policy areas is analysed, fo-
cussing on some central consequences. The consistent distinction of ageing and 
shrinking is retained throughout the paper. The impact of ageing on the social sys-
tems, the industry, society and party democracy will be discussed using the differ-
ent projections. The impact of the population decline is then analysed with regard to 
international relations, the EU, the economy, the environment and society, particu-
larly in comparison to other industrialised countries. This analysis therefore makes 
it possible to evaluate which consequences can be regarded as negative, which as 
positive and which cannot be categorised in this dichotomy.
Because of the dynamics of demographic processes, the aspect of time is vi-
tal to the evaluation of the impacts. These impacts occur many decades after the 
manifestation of low fertility, whilst ageing processes and the population decline 
Fig. 1: Consequences of an enduring low fertility
Source: Own design
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are based on differing dynamics and a different climax in the consequences. In 
this context it is of major importance whether the projections refer to the period 
up to 2030, 2060 or even 2100. Since projections become less certain as the period 
stretches, whilst on the other hand the demographic momentum makes long-term 
calculations possible, we explore the question of up to which year it makes sense to 
interpret them and which uncertainties have to be taken into account. 
The demographic analysis is then combined with a political science approach. 
There remain two fundamentally different types of policy options with regard to the 
consequences of the enduring low fertility: to infl uence the demographic indicators 
such as future fertility rates and migration, as well as to adjust responses of the indi-
vidual policy areas to the consequences. The respective policy options are analysed 
here, thus establishing a basis for demographic policy advice.
These steps allow a fi nal judgment regarding the two controversies mentioned 
above: Firstly, on the question of the overall evaluation of the phenomenon, and 
secondly whether ageing or rather the population decline is more severe for society.
3 Ageing
The ageing of the population is not only caused by the low fertility, but it is ampli-
fi ed by the increase in life expectancy. The differences in age structures between 
the industrialised countries are largely caused by the low fertility, given that the 
fertility development varies much more widely between the countries than does the 
trend in increasing life expectancy. The ageing process can be quantifi ed through 
frequency measures and age dependency ratios. For instance, the median age is 
relevant to the impact of ageing on the electoral system, whilst the age dependency 
ratio is decisive for the social insurance systems.
3.1 Median age
The median age in Germany increased from 35 in 1950 to 43 in 2009, and will rise to 
about 52 years between 2045 and 2060. The median age of voters is more authori-
tative when it comes to the assertion of changes in the relative strength of parties: 
It was quite constant in the second half of the 20th Century with 44.4 years in 1950, 
44.7 in 1970, 45.0 in 1990 and 46.4 in 2000. Reaching 50.1 in 2012, the median voter 
age increased to over 50 years for the fi rst time. 
Figure 2 shows the median voter age up to 2060 which was calculated using the 
medium variant (lower limit) of the 12th coordinated population projection (Statis-
tisches Bundesamt 2009b). Accordingly, it will increase to 55.4 years by 2030 (cf. 
Sánchez Gassen 2015: 248) and to 58 years by 2060. The main increase will be reg-
istered between 2000 and 2030. Whilst half of the voters were aged under 45 years 
until the 1990s, half will be aged over 55 from 2026 onwards, and will therefore be 
of retirement age or shortly below.
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3.2 Age dependency ratio
The age dependency ratio is a central measure for pay-as-you-go social insurance; 
it relates the ratio of people who are of retirement age to those who are of work-
ing age. The age dependency ratio used here refers to the ratio of those aged 65 
years and older to those aged 20 to 64 years. The largest share of increase in the 
age ratio takes place between 2010 and 2040. Within this period, the cohorts with 
low birth numbers will enter the labour market. This effect will be further ampli-
fi ed by the next generation, which registered even lower birth rates, as it will be 
by the so called baby boomer generation reaching retirement age between 2020 
and 2030. Figure 3 shows the projection spectrum of the Federal Statistical Offi ce 
(Statistisches Bundesamt 2009a/b). Results of the new German census, which have 
Fig. 2: Median age of the total population and of voters
Median age in years
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Notes: From 2012: Results of the 12th coordinated population projection, variant 1-W1 (for 
assumptions see Figure 3). The analysed population aged 18 and older is not identical to 
voters since it also includes those foreigners who are not eligible to vote. Since the age 
structure among Germans is somewhat older, the median voter age is slightly higher. Cal-
culations for 2011 show that this effect accounts for slightly less than one year (0.9 years).
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2009b. Own calculation together with Harun Sulak
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not yet been taken into account in current population projections only marginally 
alter the age dependency ratios. The spectrum of the basic medium variant shows 
age dependency ratios of 63.1 and 67.4 for 2060 which on the basis of 2008 corre-
sponds to an increase by 87 percent and 100 percent, respectively. The doubling of 
the current age dependency ratio is already reached in 2040 with values around 60; 
afterwards the increase slows down.
The shaded area of Figure 3 shows the progressions of the highest and lowest 
combinations of assumptions regarding migration, birth rate and life expectancy 
within the twelve different variants that have been calculated and which are re-
garded as realistic. In the variant with the highest ageing, the age dependency ratio 
reaches 65.6 in 2040, and increases to 77.1 by 2060. The variant with the lowest 
ageing, consequently the variant with the youngest age structure, shows a similar 
development until 2040 reaching 58.4, but remains constant after that (2060: 59.8).
Fig. 3: Development of the age dependency ratio on the basis of different 
assumptions
Notes: Assumptions of the base variant (1-W1): long-term annual migration balance of 
100,000, life expectancy 2060 85.0 and 89.2, respectively; TFR 1.4. base variant 2 (1-W2): 
long-term migration balance of 200,000, otherwise unchanged. Variant with the highest 
ageing (6-W1): TFR 1.2, long-term migration balance of 100,000, life expectancy 87.7 and 
91.2, respectively. Variant with the lowest ageing (3-W2): TFR 1.6, long-term migration bal-
ance of 200,000, life expectancy 85.0 and 89.2, respectively.
Source: Own design based on Statistisches Bundesamt 2009b
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Whilst the share of people aged 65 years and older doubles by 2040, the share of 
the very old (aged 80 years and older) increases even more because of rising life 
expectancy. On the basis of the medium projection variant (Statistisches Bundesamt 
2009a), it is assumed for Germany that the share of the very old will almost triple, 
from roughly 5 percent (4 million) in 2008, to 14 percent (9.05-9.23 million) by 2060.
3.3 The infl uence of future migration and fertility on ageing
That an increased immigration can only have a minor effect on ageing is clearly 
shown by the much-cited model calculation of the United Nations (UN 2000), ac-
cording to which Germany would need an exorbitant amount of immigration, name-
ly 188 million people by 2050, in order to maintain the age dependency ratio at a 
constant level. Immigrants and their somewhat higher fertility do have an impact on 
the labour market and on the age structure (Sobotka 2008), but later in life they also 
become old, and their fertility frequently tends to resemble that of Germans (Birg 
2003).
The infl uence of migration on ageing will be quantifi ed below: If the annual mi-
gration balance is around 100,000, the age dependency ratio will be 67.4 by 2060 
according to the medium projection. If immigration is twice as high for every year 
until 2060 with all other conditions remaining unchanged, the age dependency ratio 
would be 63.1. After more than 50 years with a migration balance twice as high, the 
age dependency ratio would only have fallen by 6.8 percent.
Though the fertility development of the past fi ve decades has contributed to the 
ageing process, a sudden increase in the fertility rate would have little effect on 
ageing in the short and medium term. It is the number of births and less the fertil-
ity rate that is important for the age structure. The number of potential mothers by 
2030 depends on the number of girls born in recent years. Since a succession of 
generations takes roughly 30 years and it takes another 20 years until working age 
is reached, the impact of future fertility development on the age dependency ratios 
is relatively minor for the next 50 years. 
Even if the TFR increases from roughly 1.4 to 1.6 – which means roughly 96,000 
additional births per year – the age dependency ratio would only fall from 67.4 to 
63.6 by 2060. Half a century with a much higher fertility rate would thus only reduce 
the age dependency ratio by 6 percent. If the TFR increases to 2.1 – the replace-
ment level – the age dependency ratio would remain virtually unchanged until 2040. 
Between 2040 and 2060, it would, however, no longer increase, but would slightly 
fall to 53.5 (cf. Fig. 3). This would relieve the burden on the social systems from 
2040 onwards. Compared with the base variant (TFR 1.4), the age dependency ratio 
would decline by 26.0 percent until 2060, so that the contribution rates could be 
reduced by about a quarter (or pensions could be increased accordingly).
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3.4 The (lack of) certainty of projections on ageing
Because of demographic momentum, the precision of demographic projections for 
2040 is very high, and for 2060, it is relatively high. Even with quite different as-
sumptions, the age dependency ratio only ranges between 58 and 66 by 2040. It will 
increase up to 2060 in all of the 12 projections, ranging between 60 and 77. Speaking 
of absolute fi gures, the number of people aged over 64 years will be between 21.975 
million and 25.123 million. If fertility remains low, the age dependency ratio will how-
ever no longer rise as drastically as between 2010 and 2040 since, by then, the net 
reproduction rates will have been constantly low for as long as a human lifetime. 
However, a considerable increase in the TFR to 2.1 could reduce the age dependen-
cy ratio to 53.5 by 2060, and then bring about a further reduction in ensuing years.
It can be regarded as being certain that the ageing process that has been caused 
to a considerable degree by the second fertility decline will lead to a doubling in the 
age dependency ratio by 2040, to a tripling of the share of the very old by 2050 and 
to an increase of the median voter age above 55 years. It is very likely that all three 
indicators of ageing will be roughly at this level by 2060; whether and how rapidly 
they continue to increase will depend on the future development of fertility, life ex-
pectancy and migration.
4 Population decline
Population decline is the second demographic consequence of the enduring low 
fertility. Fertility below replacement level results in net replacement fi gures below 
1. Since this has been the case in Germany for many decades now, it led to a low 
population momentum (cf. Blue/Espenshade 2011). This momentum understood as 
the age structure is responsible for shrinking processes that will persist for many 
years even if the TFR rises. Unlike the effect of ageing, migration and rising life 
expectancy slow down the population decline. The dynamics over time also differ 
fundamentally given an enduring low fertility level: Unlike ageing, shrinking fi rst 
begins gradually and increases exponentially from 2050 onwards.
4.1 Projections of the population size by 2060
The grey hatched area of Figure 4 shows the spectrum of the twelve scenarios 
which the Federal Statistical Offi ce (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009a) considers to 
be realistic. The dashed line above the scenarios is based on a model calculation 
with a TFR of 2.1, which was considered to be unrealistic.
In the base variant (TFR 1.4; life expectancy 85.0 and 89.2; migration balance 
100,000), the population decreases by 4.2 million from 2010 to 2030, by 7.7 million 
up to 2040, by 12.1 million up to 2050 and by 16.9 million up to 2060. The German 
population would then have 64.651 million residents by 2060 – a decline by 20.7 per-
cent within 50 years. The population decline would be much less pronounced in 
base variant 2, in which the long-term annual migration balance is around 200,000. 
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Germany would then have 70.120 million residents in 2060, corresponding to a de-
crease by 11.4 million, or 14 percent. Both scenarios are similarly conceivable and 
realistic, but it is diffi cult to project the long-term development. If one takes all 12 
variants into account, the population size will be between 76.6 and 81.0 million in 
2030, and between 61.8 and 76.8 million in 2060. The range between the different 
projections is considerable: In one case, the decline is minimal, namely 5.9 percent, 
over a long period of 50 years, whilst in the other case it is 24.2 percent, signifying 
an enormous population decline.
The population development at the regional level is, however, decisive for peo-
ple’s respective living conditions. There are contrary developments on the regional 
level, and even today it is evident that there are regions which are growing as well 
as regions which are shrinking. Because of the advancing internal migration, in 
combination with the amplifi cation of the demographic process which comes about 
when young people move at the beginning of their working lives, some regions 
will tend to become depopulated (cf. Kühntopf/Stedtfeld 2012). Since this aspect of 
demographic change is not primarily caused by the fertility decline, it will not be 
discussed here any further.
Fig. 4: Development of the German population size on the basis of different 
assumptions
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Note: Assumptions of the base variant see Fig. 3
Source: Own design based on Statistisches Bundesamt 2009b
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4.2 The infl uence of future migration and fertility on the shrinking 
process
The size of the population by 2060 will be infl uenced by today’s age structure and 
the future development of three indicators: fertility rate, migration and life expec-
tancy. There is no doubt that the life expectancy will continue to rise; the infl uence 
of different scenarios on the size of the population is however minor. Effects of mi-
gration and the fertility rate are, however, different: 
The effect of migration on population shrinking can be quantifi ed: According 
to the base projection, Germany’s population size would be 64.7 million by 2060, 
assuming an annual migration balance of 100,000 people from 2014 onwards. 
Assuming immigration fi gures twice as high in each year from 2020 up to 2060, 
Germany would have 70.1 million residents. 100,000 additional migrants per year 
consequently reduce the population shrinking by roughly one-third. The shrinking 
process could be completely averted until 2060 if even higher immigration fi gures 
of roughly estimated 400,000 per year are achieved.
The assumption of a permanent immigration balance of 100,000 or even 200,000 
people per year needs to be briefl y discussed: This level of immigration from 2015 
to 2060 would, when cumulated, account for a balance of 4.6 or 9.2 million people. 
Since emigrants must be deducted from immigrants in order to calculate the bal-
ance, total immigration would in fact be much higher. This fact gives rise to the 
question of typical countries of origin of possible migrants. Historically, the balance 
between 1950 and 2012 averaged 168,863 (own calculation based on Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2013b), but the development was highly volatile, and was affected by 
specifi c historic constellations such as the immigration of millions of (late) repatri-
ates or the EU enlargement. Since the TFR is now also below the replacement level 
in most classical countries of origin, a high level of permanent immigration would 
increasingly have to come from non-European countries. This would exacerbate 
the political and societal demands on the integration and recruitment of qualifi ed 
immigrants.
Now let us turn to the effect of the fertility rate: If the TFR were to be 1.6 from 
2025 onwards, instead of 1.4, the projection for 2060 amounts to 68.8 instead of 
64.7 million residents. The increase in the TFR by 0.2 over a period of 35 years 
would account for 4.1 million additional residents. Combining the mentioned ef-
fects of migration and fertility rate, and assuming a somewhat more optimistic life 
expectancy, the impact would be amplifi ed, so that the shrinking occurring up to 
2060 would be only minor with 76.8 million.
The long-term effect of the TFR on the population size is also huge with today’s 
age structure. Given certain apocalyptic and fatalistic projections (inter alia Birg 
2003), the result may be surprising: If the TFR permanently increases to 2.1, the 
population size would exceed the 83 million threshold between 2025 and 2027 and 
oscillate in the narrow range of 82 and 83 million from 2028-2060. For this esti-
mation, we used the basic assumptions of an increasing life expectancy (85.0 and 
89.2 years, respectively) and a migration balance of 100,000. The dynamics and the 
future compensation potential of demographic developments fundamentally dif-
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fer from ageing: The population decline is also completely avertable today if the 
birth rate increases to the replacement level. The later this takes place, however, the 
greater the immediate population decline.
4.3 The dynamics of the shrinking process
Model calculations up to 2100 are helpful in order to portray the exponential charac-
ter of the population decline and to categorise the impact of enduring low fertility. 
These, however, entail considerable uncertainties, not only because of the longer 
time horizon of the projection, but also because it is diffi cult to estimate the actual 
size of the migration balance as well as the TFR which both exerts a greater infl u-
ence on the projections than in the case of ageing. The dynamics of the shrinking 
process can be made clear by a hypothetical example: Without immigration, and 
if the TFR remains low, each generation would shrink by roughly 35 percent, this 
shrinking spiral accelerating from generation to generation. 
This would be an exciting phenomenon in terms of evolution biology, because 
persisting sub-replacement fertility is historically without precedence. But it is 
based on two permanent assumptions which need to be discussed: The assump-
tion that the immigration balance will not be positive corresponds neither to the 
historic development of Germany, nor to the relative attractiveness of Germany for 
migrants. Second, the following reasons might object the assumption of an endur-
ing low fertility in the future: 
• the fact that the distorting effect of the timing of births on the TFR will de-
crease at some point (Bongaarts 2001), 
• the intergenerational relation of fertility behaviour, according to which child-
less lifestyles are less likely to be reproduced (Kolk et al. 2014), 
• the long-term impact of family policy measures on fertility in an international 
comparison (Bujard 2011),
• expert assessments suggesting on average a TFR of 1.57 and 1.58 in 2030 
and 2050 (Basten et al. 2013: 68).
The latest UN projections (UN 2012) include a variant where the average TFR is 
constantly extrapolated to 2100 (Fig. 5). Accordingly, France and the United King-
dom would already overtake Germany in the fi rst half of the 21st Century when 
it comes to the size of the population. Since it will be at a similar level in all three 
countries (69.0-72.9 million) by 2050, slight changes in the migration balance or in 
the fertility development could reverse the ranking of the countries. Turkey would 
equal Germany by 2020 with 81.2 million residents, and it would be roughly one-
half larger by 2050 with 103.4 million residents. According to this model calculation, 
with 122.1 million residents Turkey would be much bigger in 2100 than EU countries 
such as France (77.8), the United Kingdom (75.1), Germany (43.4), Italy (39) or Spain 
(30.6). With regard to the historic dimension, we fi nd that a population decline of 
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this nature would be an entirely new phenomenon in world history.3 The US tells a 
different story: Because of its stationary TFR and a positive migration balance, its 
population (491.5 million by 2100) would then be 11 times that of Germany.
No one knows whether this scenario will come true. The question is whether 
the fertility rate in Germany will recover. A shrinking process is however already 
inevitable due to the current age structure: Although France and Turkey have fewer 
residents today, their absolute number of births is much higher than in Germany. 
Therefore, it is already certain today that in 30 years from now there will be more 
women of child-bearing-age in both countries. The structural population decline 
in Germany has still been concealed by immigration in recent years: For instance, 
the birth defi cit was 196,038 in 2012 (673,544 live births - 869.582 deaths), but as a 
result of the high immigration balance of 368,945, caused by the high rate of unem-
ployment in many EU countries, the population actually grew by 172,907. In years 
without a large immigration surplus, such as 2006-2009, the population declines 
each year by the amount of the birth defi cit. Without immigration, Germany is cur-
rently shrinking, by roughly 200,000 people each year. This trend will continue and 
will increase in the coming years. According to the base variant (1-W1), the birth def-
icit will exceed the threshold of 300,000 from 2021 onwards, the 400,000 threshold 
from 2029, the 500,000 threshold from 2041 and it will then settle between 500,000 
and 600,000. The population size will decline in each year from 2041 onwards by the 
3 Historic population declines are usually caused by wars or epidemics (such as the Plague).
Fig. 5: Population projections for 2050 and 2100
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equivalent of a city such as Düsseldorf, Leipzig, Bremen or Nuremberg as a result 
of the birth defi cit. An annual immigration comparable to the average migration bal-
ance of Germany since 1950-2012, namely of 168,863, could only compensate for 
almost one-third of the birth defi cit.
In summary, Germany will experience a dramatic population decline if fertility 
remains at its current level. The German age structure enhances decline; the birth 
defi cit is growing from year to year because of an accelerating dynamic. The popu-
lation decline can, however, be slowed by an increasing fertility rate, just as it can 
be through continuously high immigration levels. 
5 The impact of ageing
The consequences of the ageing process are serious for several policy fi elds. In par-
ticular, social insurance is massively affected by it (inter alia Castles 2004; Schmid 
et al. 2000). This section focuses on the most important effects for the social sys-
tems, economic development and the labour market, but also potential societal and 
cultural changes, as well as implications for competition between political parties.
5.1 The impact of ageing on the social systems
The anticipated doubling of the age dependency ratio from about 2010 to 2040 has 
immediate consequences for social insurance. The problems are greater in coun-
tries with pay-as-you-go pension systems as well as in countries with ambitious 
social systems which have a high degree of decommodifi cation and in countries 
with a low birth rate. Hence, the problems are particularly pronounced in Germany. 
These problems and their potential solutions are presented in greater detail below 
using the pension formula. In simplifi ed terms, the pension formula is made up of 
these fi ve variables: 
The contribution rate (c) corresponds to the age dependency ratio (AD) multi-
plied by the pension replacement rate (PR), multiplied by the ratio of pensioners4 
(a(P)) and workers (a(W)), multiplied by the reciprocal value of the tax share (T). An 
example using the pension formula: If the age dependency ratio doubles and eve-
rything else remains constant, the contribution rate automatically doubles as well – 
such high ancillary wage costs would have a dramatic impact on the labour market. 
If one wishes to keep the contribution rate constant, all other things being equal, the 
pension replacement rate would be halved, and widespread pension poverty would 
4 The percentage of pensioners among the population aged 60 (65) and older in relation to the 
working population in this age group.
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be the consequence. An adjustment via the retirement age would correspond to a 
de facto retirement age of 71, and therefore a formal one of roughly 75 (cf. Rürup/
Schmidt 2003), which is illusory. Furthermore, the tax share alone could not com-
pensate for this dimension. 
All four remaining components of the pension formula have been adjusted in 
Germany as a reaction to the anticipated doubling of the age dependency ratio be-
tween 2000 and 2035. If one takes a look at the almost annual, incrementalistic re-
forms of the pension system, it is easy to attribute each of these savings measures 
to one of the components of the pension formula:
1) The fi rst example is an increase in the contribution rate, which has already 
taken place 27 times since 1953 (Schmidt 2005). This is the most obvious ad-
justment. For younger people, state-subsidised investment in capital-funded 
pension insurance schemes is added to the contribution rates to the compul-
sory pay-as-you-go pension schemes. The internationalisation of the econo-
my, however, sets limits on fi nancing of pension schemes via added ancillary 
wage costs (Scharpf 2001).
2) A second possibility for adjustment is the pension replacement rate which 
has been reduced by measures such as a less generous allowance of years 
spent in training, indexing to the evolution of net wages, Blüm’s demographic 
factor (1997), Schröder’s similar sustainability factor (2004), a reduction in the 
allowance for schooling and higher education and the establishment of the 
full long-term care contribution for pensioners. The clause to maintain the 
pension replacement rate in accordance with section 154 subsection (3) of 
Book VI of the Social Code (SGB VI) only ensures the standard gross pension 
of a pensioner with 45 years’ average earnings at the level of 43 percent in 
2030 (currently 52 percent).
3) The third component of the pension formula, namely the pensioner coeffi -
cient, is adjusted by gradually increasing the formal retirement age from 65 
to 67 years between 2011 and 2029. Also, early retirement has been made 
more diffi cult in Germany, for instance via section 77 of Book VI of the Social 
Code (SGB VI), according to which the pension replacement rate decreases 
by 0.3 percent per month of early retirement. Furthermore, an increase in the 
labour market participation of the working-age population reduces the bur-
den on the social systems, which can be achieved, for example, by increas-
ing women’s labour force participation and reducing unemployment. Walter 
et al. (2013: 42) show scenarios in which a combination of these factors can 
reduce the decline in the working population up to 2030. 
4) Tax revenue for instance fl ows into the pension system via the ecotax. Con-
versely, a burden is already being imposed on the national budget by the 
funding of civil servants’ pensions, which is growing by virtue of demograph-
ic factors. Removing benefi ts which are alien to insurance, for example, con-
stitutes a transfer from the tax system to the pension system.
The long-term reforms, the increase in the retirement age to 67, and the sustain-
ability factor, have already done a lot to adjust the German pension system to the 
increase in the age dependency ratio in the next few decades. German old-age 
pension policy thus became more revenue-orientated as opposed to an orienta-
tion towards a desired replacement rate. The social burdens for contributors and 
pensioners as well as the macroeconomic burdens on the State and industry up to 
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2040 are extremely high. The argument that the pension problems brought about 
by the fertility decline could be compensated for by making progress in productivity 
(inter alia Hondrich 2007) is hardly tenable. Firstly, the shift in the age dependency 
ratio is too high, and secondly it is naive to presume that companies and workers 
will permit the entire productivity gains made over several decades only to fl ow into 
the pension funds.
The impact of ageing on statutory health and long-term care insurance is similar 
to that on old-age security in the sense that, here too, fewer contributors will be 
accounted for by more benefi ciaries. The scale is similar when it comes to ancil-
lary wage costs, but the impact of the enduring low fertility is less pronounced 
here for two reasons: Pensioners themselves contribute to fund the statutory health 
insurance, and the remaining life expectancy after retirement does not equate to 
years of illness. Health expenditure is more diffi cult to forecast since supply and 
demand for healthcare services does not only depend on demographic assump-
tions – medical progress in particular acts as a cost driver. Birg (2003: 185) cal-
culates that the contribution rate of the health insurance funds will increase from 
13 percent to 21-24 percent by 2050, and that the long-term care rate will quadruple 
to roughly 6 percent. However, in relation to GDP, and unlike the contribution rate, 
the benefi ts of statutory health insurance in Germany have remained constant for 
three decades (Rürup/Ranscht 2009: 112). The rise in long-term care costs is differ-
ent: The drastic increase in the ratio of the very old leads to an increase in specifi c 
diagnoses requiring long-term care such as dementia, which will probably cause a 
considerable growth despite improvements in medical treatment (cf. Doblhammer/
Scholz 2010). It is, however, necessary to distinguish here between professional and 
informal long-term care (Micheel 2013). Even if there is a marked increase in pub-
lic health expenditure, people will have to face a growing individual responsibility 
and a partial rationalisation of the benefi ts. This development could lead to serious 
socio-political confl icts.
Low fertility will require society to shift a growing share of productivity and pros-
perity into the social welfare systems in the next three decades, and the pension 
replacement rate and statutory health insurance benefi ts will nonetheless reduce 
in relative terms. This could not even be changed by a rapid increase of the fertility 
rate. The age dependency ratio will rise more slowly after 2040, which in turn will 
relieve pressure from the social welfare systems.
5.2 The impact of ageing on industry and the labour market 
Increasing social security contributions put an indirect burden on industry and the 
labour market – in particular for welfare states which are ambitious and are fi nanced 
to a considerable degree via the active labour force (Schmidt 2005). The conse-
quences on the social welfare state that have been described above may have nega-
tive effects on the labour market, which can, however, be regulated by politics, if 
these negative effects are not largely transferred to ancillary wage costs. People 
occasionally argue that the shrinking supply of workers reduces unemployment. 
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This is, however, based on a static understanding of supply and demand since such 
impacts can only occur in the short term (Friedman 1968). 
There are controversial discussions whether the productivity of an older work-
force changes. The hypothesis according to which ageing is accompanied by a de-
cline in innovativeness cannot be verifi ed. Research by Guilford is quoted in some 
cases (Sinn 2003: 67), according to which the greatest mental performance is 
reached at the age of 30-40. This hypothesis is, however, too undifferentiated since 
knowledge and experience increase as workers age (Akademiegruppe Altern 2009: 
41). Furthermore, the fi tness of 60-year-olds is constantly increasing. One central 
point can be infl uenced by politics: Investment in human capital can also enhance 
innovation among older workers by increasing further training activities.
The impact on industrial growth can be understood using the Cobb-Douglas 
production function which is made up of technical progress, labour input and capi-
tal input. Labour input understood as the labour force will decline in the next three 
decades in absolute and relative terms as a result of the enduring low fertility. This 
impact could be compensated for by even greater technical progress or more capi-
tal investment. According to various model calculations, Europe’s economic growth 
rate could drop permanently: from 2.3 percent to 0.5 percent for 2025-2050 accord-
ing to the OECD (1998). Intensifying capital (Lee/Mason 2007) or increased invest-
ment in education (Lutz et al. 2008) can, however, compensate for the negative 
effects of ageing. Striessnig and Lutz (2013) use simulation models controlled for 
education to show that fertility rates below the replacement rate could also be opti-
mal. Focussing demographic consequences only on GDP growth has its limits since 
it is not equivalent to the rise in quality of life (Easterlin 1974).
In various sectors, ageing induces further shifts in demands besides these over-
all effects (Kaufmann 2005). For instance, long-term care services, tourism, old-
people’s homes and fi nancial services will attract attention in the future. As another 
result of ageing, inheritances increase, thus opening up a large source of income for 
the State and increasing per capita assets. 
5.3 The impact of ageing for society and culture
Due to the increase in life expectancy and the compression of morbidity into a small 
number of years, ageing is a phenomenon that is generally advantageous for many 
people in the sense of “years gained” (Imhof 1981). The low fertility, however, ad-
ditionally entails a shift in the cohort sizes between young and old, its impact on 
society is ambivalent and speculative. Risk aversion could be higher in ageing soci-
eties (Kaufmann 2005), whilst on the other hand this has a highly stabilising impact 
in comparison to extremely young societies (Huntington 1996). The hypothesis of a 
quantitative reduction in family relationships and family networks (inter alia Schirr-
macher 2004) is questionable in light of demographic projections (Dudel 2014).
The terms “age”, “overageing” and “ageing society” have largely negative as-
sociations, and in some cases are weighed down with clichés (Akademiegruppe 
Altern 2009). Schirrmacher (2004) outlines future scenarios of a “war of the genera-
tions” and “racist age stereotypes”. Kruse (2013), by contrast, points to potentials 
Consequences of Enduring Low Fertility – A German Case Study    • 149
such as differentiated knowledge, refl ected experience, resilience, generativity and 
gerotranscendence. Höhn et al. (2006) show that people in OECD countries are not 
hostile to the elderly, and that the experience of older people is appreciated. Fur-
thermore, it should be taken into account that the 70-year-olds of the future will be 
much healthier, more mobile and more independent than 70-year-olds in the past. In 
this regard, the third stage of life of retirees and those drawing a pension provides 
enormous opportunities, both individually and in terms of civil society, for instance 
through (community) volunteering of this age group. Moreover, there are diverse 
relationships and transfers when it comes to intergenerational relationships where 
elderly people have great potential to take part and give support. Relationship qual-
ity is of great importance in this case (see Ette et al. 2010 for details). The societal 
impact of ageing is not only highly speculative, but also depends on how policy 
makers and society deal with it. Here, the Research Group Ageing (Akademiegruppe 
Altern 2009) is calling for a re-think at the individual level of traditional life course 
concepts, for continuous investment in qualifi cations at the level of companies, and 
for overcoming a negative perception of age at the societal level.
5.4 The impact of ageing on party competition
As was shown above, the median age of voters will increase by 2040 to such an ex-
tent that pensioners and persons about to retire will form a majority in the electoral 
system. This means that people who are no longer working will make decisions that 
primarily affect the working age population. The question is how these interests will 
impact the party political system and political decision-making – whether they may 
even lead to a “gerontocracy”.
Voters’ long-term loyalties to parties and to social environments, and the ad-
aptation of the parties to perpetuate the existing system, suggest that pensioners’ 
interests will be asserted within the party system. It is also diffi cult to imagine age 
constituting a line of confl ict since both sides mostly occur in the life course (Go-
erres 2007). However, particularly the catch-all parties like SPD (Social Democratic 
Party of Germany) and CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany) could 
mutate to become parties which especially represent the interests of pensioners, 
especially because pensioners are their most loyal electorate. One such example is 
the Coalition Agreement of the third Grand Coalition, which provides for a pension 
for women with children born before 1992 and a pension at 63 for people who have 
contributed to the pension system for at least 45 years (CDU, CSU, SPD 2013). When 
catch-all parties are too ambitious representing the interests of pensioners, they 
might enable smaller parties to establish as advocates for the under 50-year-olds. 
Differences between old and young can already be seen when analysing attitudes 
towards the pension policy and voting behaviour (Bergmann et al. 2012).
A variety of future scenarios is conceivable: The line of confl ict between old and 
young, and between benefi ciaries of and contributors to the social welfare state, 
could be refl ected in the party system as well as in the union structure, which might 
cause the struggle for resources to become more extreme with regard to party 
competition and polarising rhetoric in the media. The preference in favour of social 
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expenditure such as pensions or education depends on age to a considerable de-
gree (Busemeyer et al. 2009). It would, however, also be possible that this confl ict is 
taken up and channelled by the established parties and interest groups which allow 
older lines of confl ict to remain dominant. Since older people show a considerable 
interest in the welfare of the younger generations, especially if they themselves have 
children and grandchildren, compromise between the interests of different genera-
tions is also conceivable (cf. Bergmann et al. 2012). A confl ict line between childless 
people and families would appear more likely in this regard since the former do not 
have any such relationship establishing ties between the generations. A sustainable 
family policy promoting births and being orientated towards the well-being of chil-
dren would also encourage solidarity between the generations, and such a policy 
would directly benefi t the young generation, the older generation would indirectly 
profi t via the weakening in pressure from demographic problems.
6 The impact of the population decline
6.1 The impact of the population decline on international relations and 
the EU
There are several historical examples of the demographic impact on a country’s 
strength in terms of foreign and defence policy. A decline in Europe’s political pow-
er was already predicted in 1945 by Davis (1945: 603). The infl uence of the shifts 
in the demographic weights between France, Germany and Russia on the military 
strength in the 19th and early 20th Centuries was frequently discussed – also in the 
context of the outbreak of the First World War (Morgenthau 1948: 123). The eco-
nomic and power political aspects of the population size also played a major role in 
the mercantile era or in Ancient times, with regard to the Fall of Rome.
There is no doubt that the population decline will lead to a relative loss of for-
eign policy signifi cance in the particularly adversely affected states of Europe and 
East Asia. Statements such as the “demographic demise of Germany and Europe” 
suggested in Birg (2003: 14) are, however, untenable on the basis of demographic 
analyses. The “shift in international weights” (Wöhlcke et al. 2004: 11) has implica-
tions for international relations which are particularly interesting with regard to the 
political sciences. From a (neo)realistic perspective (Morgenthau 1948), a nexus of a 
population decline and a loss of power can be derived from the resulting weakening 
of military power and, from the point of view of interdependency theory (Keohane/
Nye 1977), from a decline in the infl uence exercised in international organisations 
such as the UN and NATO, but also the EU. The population size has a direct impact 
where a legitimation is derived from the democratic principle – such as the qualifi ed 
majority in decisions of the European Council. Moreover, when there is a population 
decline, the economic power and hence also the military potential decrease – in 
particular in relation to those states whose population and economic power still in-
crease. Whether the EU can become established as a global power alongside the US 
and China will not solely depend on demographic developments. The EU-28 would 
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still have well over 300 million inhabitants in 2100 were its TFR to remain constant. 
Rather, the development of the political criteria is decisive, that is the degree to 
which foreign and defence policy integration within the EU leads to the “ability to 
take political action, political consensus and experience of order” (Weidenfeld 1995; 
translated by CPoS). 
Demographic developments will reduce Germany’s present dominance within 
the EU in the long term. Germany is not only the strongest member in economic 
terms, but also has the largest population, with almost 20 million inhabitants more 
than France and the United Kingdom. The margin will have shrunk to less than 10 
million in 2030, all three states will be at the same level in the 2040s, and both may 
overtake Germany 30 years from now. When it comes to the impact on Germany’s 
status within the EU, there is a need to distinguish between the democratic prin-
ciple and economic power: The balance of power in the EU’s Council of Ministers 
will shift in the next few decades since the majority decisions require a qualifi ed 
majority meaning 55 percent of EU countries and at the same time these have to 
represent 65 percent of the EU’s population. This leads to new structural majorities 
and blocking minorities (Münch/Wilkoszewski 2006), and Germany’s infl uence will 
decline in line with the above projections. The same applies to Germany’s represen-
tation in the European Parliament (EP). Secondly, the enduring low fertility reduces 
the country’s overall economic power more severely than what is calculated on a 
per capita basis. Even given all the uncertainty with regard to the long-term eco-
nomic development – in demographic terms –, a considerable decline in Germany’s 
economic dominance seems plausible. Today’s internal EU migration to Germany 
has massive foreign policy implications against this background.
6.2 The impact of the population decline for the economy
Several economic theories are based on the nexus between population size and 
the economy. According to Adam Smith (1776), population growth increases the 
potential in terms of the division of labour and economies of scale. The opposite 
conclusion of the population decline is however of subordinate signifi cance when it 
comes to large internal markets such as the EU and globalised commodity markets. 
Keynes regards the slight population decline as having contributed towards the 
weak demand in the Great Depression at that time. Several neoclassical approaches 
externalise the population development (inter alia Friedman 1968). Solow’s theory 
of economic growth (1956), by contrast, analyses the interaction between popula-
tion growth, income and investment. According to his theory, the per capita stock 
of capital falls as population growth increases, and conversely population decline 
can hence lead to an increase in per capita investment and per capita gross do-
mestic product (per capita GDP). From a neoclassical point of view, a shortage of 
labour force can be substituted by an increase in capital investment. Accordingly, 
total GDP can increase even if there is a population decline if technical progress and 
investment overcompensate for this.
In order to bring about technical progress, however, it is especially good training 
of as many workers as possible that is signifi cant, and not only capital investment. 
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This is also discussed by human capital theory (Schultz 1971). Since human capital 
is made up of the product of workforce and its average skills, a population decline 
can be theoretically compensated for by investing in education (Lutz et al. 2008). 
To this end, investment in education in countries with a TFR of around 1.4 would, 
however, have to be much greater than in countries with higher fertility. Since this 
has not been the case in Germany since 1975 despite a net reproduction rate of 0.59 
to 0.69, Kaufmann (2005) calculates an investment defi cit in human capital of 2.5 
trillion euros.
It can, however, be questioned to solely determine the economic impact on 
growth by a country’s GDP: Per capita GDP is much more signifi cant in terms of 
prosperity, both now and in the future, than total GDP, given that a population de-
cline may cause GDP to fall, whilst per capita GDP rises.
If one looks at the assets of the national economy instead of growth, a more pos-
itive result is reached since per capita assets increase if the denominator becomes 
smaller and all other things being equal. However, public debt also increases in the 
case of a population decline when looking at per capita rates. The two together sug-
gest the conclusion that greater taxation on assets would then make sense. Another 
major aspect relates to the concentration of assets and to distributive justice, which 
in future might have to be brought about through greater taxation on inherited as-
sets. A growing group of individuals will not be able to leave assets to their own 
children since the number of childless women and men has risen to more than 
20 percent (based on the 1960s cohorts, cf. Statistisches Bundesamt 2013a). The 
volume of inheritance tax could be greater in relative terms in this group if the taxa-
tion of inheritance to direct offspring is favoured by means of providing for exemp-
tions. If one looks at prosperity from the perspective of Sen (1995), who stresses 
the opportunities for participation, a positive impact is even possible: Given the fact 
that cohorts are smaller, and because of the need for well-trained workers, there 
will be increasing economic incentives to train those sections of society with lower 
educational levels in order to “enable” them to participate.
The population decline will lead to a huge structural transformation which will 
be especially dramatic in rural regions. Because of internal migration, particularly 
of the young population to urban regions where there are jobs, the population de-
cline in some urban regions will be compensated for and intensifi ed still further in 
deindustrialised and rural regions. This impact becomes already visible in Eastern 
Germany today. However, some towns and cities will also shrink. These regional 
disparities entail major challenges for public welfare, particularly services offered 
and public infrastructure such as schools, kindergartens, hospitals, long-term care 
facilities or the fi re service (cf. BMI 2012; Steinführer et al. 2014). The impact on 
rental and real estate markets in the shrinking rural regions is considerable, being 
positive for tenants and negative for real estate owners.
6.3 The impact of the population decline on the environment
The impact of the population decline in terms of energy and the environment, by 
contrast, is positive since the consumption of resources and environmental pollu-
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tion decreases as the population becomes smaller, all other things being equal. At 
the national level, a population decline could be used for re-naturalisation in some 
regions. The global perspective is, however, much more signifi cant here since re-
source consumption in industrialised countries such as Germany is disproportion-
ately high (see also: Meadows et al. 1972). Since Meadows’ publication, per capita 
resource consumption in the industrialised countries has increased with regard to 
most types of resources. The per capita ecological footprint increased by 30 per-
cent in Europe between 1961 and 2007 and by 42 percent in Germany (Ewing et al. 
2010: 63). A standard for sustainability is that the environmental resources used can 
be regenerated in the long term. This is not the case in a global perspective which 
is expressed in climate change and the loss of biodiversity as well as in increasing 
resource shortages in terms of energy, water or fi sh stocks. In this respect, a popu-
lation decline can be seen as an opportunity to reduce resource consumption and 
climate change.
The potential for savings in Germany should however be placed into a global 
perspective: Firstly, the population of Germany only accounts for 1.1 percent of 
the world’s population, and this share is declining (UN 2012). Secondly, resource 
consumption is massively increasing in the developing and threshold countries, in 
which the largest share of the world’s population lives. The following fi gures on 
resource consumption, measured in global hectares per person (gha) in 2007 make 
the ratios clear: The ecological footprint of production in Germany is 4.72 gha, and 
that of consumption is 5.08 gha, whilst biocapacity is 1.92. This per capita shortfall 
that has been calculated is multiplied by the population size. According to that, 2.65 
times as many resources are consumed in Germany in comparison to biocapacity. 
Globally, “only” 1.52 times the resources are consumed (Ewing et al. 2010: 31). Ac-
cordingly, the German defi cit, at 165 percent, is more than three times as large as 
the global one at 52 percent. If the population size declines, per capita biocapacity 
increases according to this model.
In addition to this impact, the symbolic effect should not be underestimated if, 
in an industrialised country, resource consumption and the size of the population 
decrease. Moreover, the fi ndings can also be transferred to other countries, and a 
population decline in several industrialised countries might cause a considerable 
relief to the environment. Apart from this demographic argument, there are other 
political and technological possibilities to reduce environmental burdens.
6.4 The impact of the population decline on society and culture
It is diffi cult to estimate the cultural impact. Most social institutions such as the 
Churches, trade unions, political parties and associations will lose members. The 
term “depopulation”, or even the analogy with the Thirty Years’ War (Schmid et al. 
2000: 184), are not appropriate as such, given a population decline of 14 to 21 per-
cent by 2060 according to the medium projections. However, there are regions in 
which emigration coincides with low fertility, which might constitute a dramatic de-
population for those who remain. This is particularly the case in some regions of 
Eastern Germany, albeit this is not only caused by East-West migration, but also by 
•    Martin Bujard154
migration between Eastern German regions (Sander 2014). What societal impact 
this will have also depends on the compensating effect of regional politics. In ad-
dition to these weak regions, there will be prosperous towns, cities and regions 
whose population will not decline in the following decades. 
It is the population which is the medium of a country’s culture and language. If 
it shrinks, the number of people who understand and speak the language, and who 
live and pass on the cultural traditions, also declines. The community characterised 
as sharing a common communication, experience as well as a common memory 
establishing the collective identity (Kielmannsegg 1995) become smaller as a result 
of the population decline. The degree to which a decline in cultural signifi cance in an 
international comparison or a smaller medium for cultural and historical experience 
is regarded as being negative is evaluated very differently. The attempt, despite 
the constant level of immigration, to permanently exclude people with a migration 
background from these “communication communities” over generations (be it via 
population projections, cf. Birg 2003) is a falsehood – not only because it presumes 
a lack of willingness to become integrated and of the effect of integration policy for 
the future, but also in view of mixed family formation and the impact of nationality 
law.
7 Conclusion, synthesis and discussion
The case study on Germany shows that the impact of the enduring low fertility 
depends to a considerable degree on political decisions, but also on the future mi-
gration rate. The extreme assessments of some authors are not appropriate. The 
change in German fertility is neither a “blessing”, nor will it lead to the “demise 
of Germany”. Enduring low fertility leads to two demographic processes, namely 
ageing and a population decline, which both have a massive impact on the future 
societal, political and economic development. The intensity, time and evaluation of 
the impact differ depending on the policy area. In an overall evaluation, the impact 
is largely negative, partly ambivalent and manifests itself in the long term with a 
considerable intensity – according to this paper. This contradicts the increasingly 
occurring evaluations which suggest a neutral overall balance of the impact of the 
enduring low fertility with its challenges and opportunities. On the other hand, the 
consequences for party competition, culture, the labour market and the economy 
are not necessarily negative since they depend on political decisions and evaluation 
perspectives.
This overall evaluation needs to be accompanied by general distinctions re-
garding demographic projections as well as political, economic and cultural conse-
quences: 
(1) Some demographic effects are certain, whilst others are based on scenarios 
where we do not know whether they will come about. Ageing is almost cer-
tain, and in particular the fact that the age dependency ratio will more than 
double from 2000 to 2040. The 20-65 age dependency ratio, which was 33.7 
in 2008, will be between 57 and 66 in 2040. There is also certainty that the 
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median voter age will rise from today’s 50.1 to roughly 55 years by 2030, with 
a further increase in the subsequent years. The situation is slightly different 
when it comes to the population decline: It is an open question even today 
whether and to what extend we will actually experience it. The population 
would be around 82-83 million by 2060 if the TFR does soon increase to 2.1 
and under the condition of a moderate migration balance of 100,000. This 
scenario is not the most probable one, but it is also not entirely unrealistic. In 
more realistic scenarios with a TFR between 1.2 and 1.6, the population will 
be between 74 and 78 million by 2040 and between 61 and 77 million by 2060. 
If, however, the TFR were to remain at the same low level for the next 86 years 
and the migration balance does not increase, the German population would 
shrink considerably to 43.4 million. Such long-term projections are, however, 
highly speculative.
(2) Some political developments can be shaped in such a way that they cannot 
generally be categorised in the dichotomy of “positive-negative”; others, in 
turn, are negative irrespective of possible structural adjustments. The most 
negative development relates to the impact on the social systems. Even if 
the halving of the pensions (which, all other things being equal, would cor-
respond to doubling the age dependency ratio) can be avoided by combining 
a higher de facto and legal retirement age, tax subsidies, an increase in the 
contribution rates and higher female labour force participation, and horror 
scenarios are thus avoidable: The enduring low fertility considerably reduces 
future prosperity. Without ageing, the increase in the de facto retirement age 
and in female labour force participation would lead to higher pensions and 
lower ancillary wage costs. Pensions will be lower for several decades from 
2030 onwards and the benefi ts provided by the health insurance funds will be 
more restricted, leading to rising pension poverty and exclusion from some 
healthcare services. Moreover, a considerable share of the increase in the 
productivity of the working generations will be used to fund social security 
systems. 
  The impact on party competition results from the increase in the median age 
of voters: The electoral infl uence exerted by pensioners increases rapidly. 
The question remains to what degree this leads to reforms being blocked or 
changes in the political party system. Such scenarios become likely when 
thinking of pensioners’ shared monetary interests in questions related to dis-
tribution, but, on the other hand, are being objected when thinking of the 
ability of political parties to adapt and of the intergenerational solidarity of 
the electorate. Within the EU, the relative weight of Germany might decrease 
as a result of the enduring low fertility. In the 2040s, France and the United 
Kingdom will have a similar population size to that of Germany. This will have 
a direct impact via the qualifi ed majority in the Council and the number of EP 
members, as well as indirectly via negotiation positions and industrial power.
(3) The economic impact of the low fertility in Germany differs. The impact on 
potential growth and GDP tends to be negative because of the higher age de-
pendency ratio (ageing) and the decline in human capital (population decline). 
However, the decline of the working population can be compensated for by 
higher level of labour market participation, a larger capital stock and espe-
cially higher education. Negative overall effects on the per capita GDP are not 
plausible, however. The more severe the population decline, the more the per 
capita public debt will increase, but this also applies to per capita assets. The 
sectoral shifts in demand will be considerable. On the regional level, the im-
pact of the population decline will substantially differ due to unequal internal 
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migration. There will be deserted regions with falling real estate prices facing 
regional policy challenges, just as there will be prosperous towns and cities. 
(4) The cultural impact of ageing will vary widely. Negative age stereotypes are 
rather unrealistic since pensioners will be healthier and fi tter than was the 
case in earlier generations. (Community) Volunteering and the public percep-
tion of the pensioners’ generation will increase. The extent of an impact on 
cultural in the case of enduring low fertility – a scenario which is possible but 
not certain – is diffi cult to assess in normative terms. The language media 
and common memory would reduce in size. This, however, will have virtu-
ally no impact on everyday cultural life, but the international profi le might 
be weakened. Since, at the same time, the share of people with a migration 
background will increase, culture will also become more diverse. Evaluations 
of this development are highly subjective. Integration policy and language 
skills will certainly take on an increasingly important role. A common com-
munication, experience as well as a common memory can relate both to past 
centuries, as well as to shorter periods of time which are shared by people 
with and without a migration background.
Table 1 summarises for each analysed policy area the demographic probability 
of certain possible impacts, their time horizon, the policy options and an evaluation 
of the impact.
The question whether ageing or rather a population decline is associated with 
worse consequence of the enduring low fertility for people can be answered now: 
it is ageing. First, because it is certain that the age dependency ratio will double by 
2040, whilst a population decline by more than 20 percent is by no means certain. 
Secondly, ageing has a massive impact on the social systems, and hence on the 
prosperity of almost all Germans. The most serious consequence of a population 
decline, on the other hand, namely a possible “cultural demise of Germany”, will 
be virtually intangible in everyday life unless it results in a lack of integration of 
migrants. This, however, would not be a consequence of low fertility. From the per-
spective of the state, however, the population decline indeed has a negative impact 
since it contributes to a decline in international infl uence and power.
One central fi nding is that an analytical distinction brings about a major advan-
tage when analysing the impacts of ageing and the impacts of the population de-
cline since the two differ substantially with regard to the time horizon, the dynamic 
and the infl uence of migration and increasing life expectancy. This partly explains 
the heterogeneous interpretations since the literature does frequently not distin-
guish precisely between these demographic processes.
Those authors who deny the negative impact of the Second Demographic Tran-
sition (inter alia Müller 2004; Hondrich 2007), do not similarly perceive the highly 
negative consequences for the social security systems. Given the doubling of the 
age dependency ratio, it is frequently argued that future growth in productivity as 
well as migration might compensate for ageing but without giving detailed refer-
ences. Both are, however, seriously overestimated in relation to the dynamic of 
ageing. Furthermore, developments of the two demographic transitions (FDT and 
SDT) are mixed, and misleading analogies are drawn. On the other hand, scenarios 
put forward by some demographers, who stress the negative consequences of the 
enduring low fertility (inter alia Schmid et al. 2000; Birg 2003), are clearly exagger-
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ated. This is contributed to by the specifi c selection of (negative) assumptions, and 
by the failure to categorise the uncertainty attached to long-term model calculations 
in case of the population decline.
If, however, evaluations do not only relate to low fertility, but to the demograph-
ic change as a whole, a normative neutral evaluation is not implausible (inter alia 
Merkel 2013). Since it entails a positive phenomenon, namely the increase in life 
expectancy (Akademiegruppe Altern 2009; Kruse 2013), and a negative one in the 
enduring low fertility. These two phenomena are, however, not interdependent. 
Whilst increasing life expectancy affects all industrialised countries, only some of 
the countries, such as Germany, are characterised by low fertility.
How can fi ndings derived from the case study on Germany be transferred to 
other countries? Low fertility rates do not have such consequences if they are only 
low for a few years. In Germany, by contrast, the enduring low fertility has taken 
on a dynamic force since it already stretches across two generations now. Some 
Southern and Eastern European states, as well as Japan and South Korea, currently 
face a similar development. If the low-fertility syndrome lasts for a similar period 
in these countries as it does in Germany, the shrinking process in Southern and 
Eastern Europe will be even more pronounced since Germany has benefi ted from 
considerable net immigration in recent decades and some of these countries are af-
fected by waves of emigration. Since Germany is an immigration destination coun-
try to which many people have moved from Southern and Eastern Europe, because 
of the wave of ethnic German resettlers from the (former) Soviet Union after the fall 
of the Iron Curtain, as well as due to the fi nancial crisis, the shrinking process set in 
motion by an enduring low fertility has been compensated for. This is not the case 
for Japan; here the age dependency ratio will rise greater than in Germany since 
life expectancy is several years higher there. Countries such as France with a more 
pronounced baby boom also have problems with the pensions system despite a 
TFR around the replacement level, since the age dependency ratio also rises rapidly 
when the baby boomer generation reaches retirement age.
In the fi rst two decades after the start of low fertility in 1975, Germany did not 
react to the impact on the social systems, or only did so by enacting minor reform 
measures. The more extensive pension reform, which increased the retirement age 
by two years, was adopted in 2007, and thus in the 33rd year in which the TFR was 
lower than 1.5. An offi cial interdepartmental Demography Strategy was presented 
in 2012, in Germany’s 38th year as a low-fertility country. The more visible the age 
effect and the population decline, the more intensive becomes the political and me-
dia debate on demography. As has been shown, the German debate on demogra-
phy features considerable exaggerations and extreme positions. This situation may 
not be transferable to other countries since the experience with pronatalistic abuse 
in Nazi Germany has cast a long shadow over the debate. On the other hand, the 
discussion of the demographic impact is made more complicated when researcher 
describe specifi c developments which cannot yet be seen by the citizens. The im-
pact for the economy, the labour market, the environment and party competition 
can also largely be transferred to other countries if the phenomenon of low fertility 
lasts for a similarly long period there. The impact on the balance of power within 
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the EU is particularly serious from the perspective of Germany since Germany has a 
leading position regarding the size of its economy and of its population, and might 
lose its position should there be a considerable population decline. On the contrary, 
when it comes to other countries such as Estonia the cultural impact is huge since 
the language media and the common memory there are relatively small.
Since the occurrence of enduring low fertility is a phenomenon which has taken 
on a new dimension, many effects are still uncertain and are subject to future re-
search. Immigration may decelerate the population decline, possibly at the expense 
of additional problems, but this has no effect on ageing. The analysis of the impact 
shows that countries such as Germany have a fundamental interest in increasing fu-
ture birth rates. The potential long-term impact of a mixture of family policies on the 
TFR (Bujard 2011; Luci-Greulich/Thévenon 2013) makes family policy a key policy 
area in the future. The impact on social insurance within the next two decades can, 
however, no longer be averted by demographic means. If, however, the fertility rate 
rises to replacement level, the age dependency ratio could be 26 percent lower by 
2060 compared to a scenario with a constant low TFR. This would imply long-term 
latitude to increase pensions for the generations born after 1970. In order to avert 
the projected population decline, an increase in the TFR would be the central ad-
justment. Even if it does not increase within the next one, two or three decades, the 
negative scenarios of an exponential population decline could be averted.
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